Shreya Malhotra

CONTACT INFORMATION

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RESEARCH INTERESTS

Family Economics, Law and Economics, Behavioral Economics

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics,   2018-2022 *(E)*
Jawaharlal Nehru University, India
Committee: Dr. Brishti Guha (chair),
Dr. Sangeeta Bansal, Dr. Indrani Roy Chowdhury

M.Phil., Economics,   2016-2018
Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

MA Economics,   2013-2015
Department of Economics,
Jamia Millia Islamia, India

BA (Hons) Economics,   2010-2013
Ramjas College, University of Delhi

PAPERS

Do prenups affect conspicuous consumption in the courtship market? A Game Theoretic Analysis with Heterogenous Type (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: I build the model assuming two-sided incomplete Information, that is, potential partners have incomplete information about each other's type in the mate-selection process. I assume equal bargaining power of both partners. In my model, a woman offers prenup in the marriage which the man can either accept or reject. Man can reject prenup and still get married by entering into a costly courtship during which he attempts to signal his worth as a high-income partner. I check if the preference of a woman for a man's lifetime income and disutility from domestic violence affects the amount of conspicuous consumption required by her in the courtship period to agree to the marriage.

I construct a three-stage sequential game with two players: a woman and a man and both of them are of two types unknown to each other. Man derives positive utility from marriage and violence and woman derives positive utility from conspicuous consumption and negative utility from violence. I find parameter zones where the ability to offer prenup a) reduces conspicuous consumption or b) affects marriage rate, even when it doesn't affect conspicuous consumption. Interestingly, I find that woman who cares more about the lifetime income that a man brings to the marriage than the disutility she gets from violent behaviour is willing to say yes to marriage at lower threshold values of conspicuous consumption. I also find that, when being single becomes more attractive, women require a higher threshold value of conspicuous consumption to agree to the marriage.

Does Divorce Law Liberalisation Impact Domestic Violence?
SAGE JOURNALS, 2022

Abstract: I examine the extent to which a shift from a mutual consent divorce regime to a unilateral divorce regime succeeds in preventing domestic violence. In my framework, a partner may be inclined to violence but dislikes being subjected to a partner's violence. I find that, when payoff from marriage is positive, both parties choose the maximum level of violence under a mutual consent regime. There is a parameter zone within which domestic violence falls as a transition is made to unilateral divorce regime. Further, I find that policymakers can reduce the cost of filing for divorce. I also find that the marriage rate changes with the switch in the regime.

IN PROGRESS

Does the option to sign Prenuptial Agreements affect Domestic Violence? (Available at SSRN)

Abstract: I construct a three-stage simultaneous move game to evaluate the impact of having the option of signing a prenuptial agreement on domestic violence. In my framework, partners like exerting violence but dislike being subjected to violence by their partners. I find that the extent of violence chosen by partners under a state division rule is high, regardless of whether they file for divorce or not. I derive conditions under which a prenup reduces domestic violence. Having a prenup option does not necessarily reduce violence if the cost of filing for divorce is high or if the cost of violence borne by the accused at the time of divorce is low. My work suggests reducing the cost of filing for divorce and the cost of signing prenups including stigma as well as monetary costs) may reduce domestic violence.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Assistant Professor, University of Delhi	2016-2022
Public Economics	Summer 2016 and 2017
Financial Economics	Winter 2017
Introductory Econometrics	Summer 2019
Intermediate Microeconomics	Winter 2018 and 2019
Statistical Methods for Economics	Winter 2019
Research Methodology	Winter 2020
Data Analysis	Summer 2020 and 2021
Principles of Microeconomics	Winter 2021
Mathematical Methods for Economics	Winter 2022

Teaching Assistant, Jawaharlal Nehru University	2017
Macroeconomics I (Dr. Brishti Guha)	
Macroeconomics II (Prof. Sushama Murty)	

Visiting Assistant Professor
Indian School of Business and Finance, India

Monetary Economics	Winter 2022

Delhi Technological University, India	2019-2021
International Trade	
Public Economics	

Mathematical Methods for Economics
Introductory Microeconomics
Introductory Macroeconomics
Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Sciences, India

Money, Banking and Financial Institutions	Summer 2021
Applied Economics	Summer 2021 and Winter 2022

WORK EXPERIENCE	Research Assistant to Harry Conaway Policy Futures Network, United States	Jul 2022 - Present
	Contributing Writer, Market Express	Aug 2022-Present
	Research Assistant to Prof. B.K. Pradhan Institute of Economic Growth, India	Summer 2017
	Research Assistant to Prof. S.K. Mohanty, Research and Information System for Developing Countries	2015-2016
	Research Assistant to Dr. Malabika Roy Institute of Economic Growth, India	Summer 2014

FELLOWSHIPS	Junior Research Fellowship, UGC (Awarded for 5 years)	2016

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	Winter School (Delhi School of Economics)	2021
	Annual Conference of Economics and Public Policy, O.P. Jindal Global University	2021

TECHNICAL SKILLS	Language: Python, R, Stata, SQL
	Tools: Panel Data Econometrics, Causal Inference, Applied Statistics

REFERENCES	**Brishti Guha**, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Phone: +91 8130939763, Email: brishtiguha@gmail.com
	Pavel Chakraborty, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics Lancaster University, UK. Email: p.chakraborty1@lancaster.ac.uk
	Sangita Singh, Associate Professor, Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi, India. Phone: +91 9810125097. Email: sangita@db.du.ac.in